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Abstract
In the field of commercial nuclear reactor security, the concept of target sets has
matured since its invention in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the codification of target
set regulations by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2009 and
publishing of official guidance in 2010. Target sets have evolved into a complex and
useful tool to develop and test a protective strategy. By their definition, target sets are the
“minimum combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from
performing their intended safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would
likely result in significant core damage” and are strongly related to probabilistic risk
assessment. Though current guidance encourages the use of probabilistic risk assessment
to inform the development of target sets, there exist no tools to assist in developing the
hundreds of thousands of equipment combinations that meet the definition of target sets.
This report seeks to outline the requirements for a computer code system that
would use a probabilistic risk assessment to provide the backbone for the development
and maintenance of target sets for a commercial nuclear reactor or other complex facility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background on Target Sets
The concept of Target Sets is based in the field of nuclear reactor facility security.
The term was first used to describe the specific combination of equipment that would
have to be made inoperable in order for an adversary to effect core damage. The current
definition is found in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.81 “Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear
Power Reactors.” RG 5.81 defines target sets as: “The minimum combination of
equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from performing their intended
safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant
core damage (e.g., nonincipient, nonlocalized fuel melting and/or core destruction) or a
loss of spent fuel pool coolant inventory and exposure of spent fuel, barring extraordinary
actions by plant operations.” The definition of and guidance on target sets took time to
mature as the NRC staff focused efforts to review and update security regulations and
guidance after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Target sets were initially used as part of the NRC Operational Safeguards
Response Evaluation (OSRE) Program conducted during the 1990s at licensed United
States (US) commercial nuclear reactor facilities through 2001. In the OSRE program,
the NRC requested licensees submit to Force-On-Force (FOF) exercises to test the
effectiveness of a licensee’s protective strategy. Target sets were used as an evaluation
tool, providing the groups of targets that the mock adversarial force sought to destroy or
compromise. For these evaluations, target set development guidance to licensees was
unsubstantial, but was sufficient for the optional FOF exercises and accompanying
evaluations at that time.
After the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued NRC Security Order EA02-026 “Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Nuclear Power
Plants,” in 2002 and EA-03-086, “Design Basis Threat for Radiological Sabotage,” in
1

2003 to licensees to increase security precautions at reactor facilities. The security orders
dictated that FOF exercises be conducted at each commercial nuclear power plant at least
once every three years, and required licensees to create and maintain target sets to inform
the protective strategy and be used in the FOF program. The NRC did not issue guidance
on target sets, and licensees instead used industry-developed guidance that was intended
primarily for FOF exercises, that being Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 03-11, “Guidance
for the Preparation and Conduct of Force-on-Force Exercises.” In 2006, the NRC Staff
planned a large power reactor security rulemaking (that included target sets), but in 2007
NRC Commissioners instructed the Staff to terminate the rulemaking and instead develop
guidance for target sets. Preliminary work was conducted and guidance was given to
new reactor applicants in September 2009. Target sets were planned to be included in a
future rulemaking to update to Title 10 Part 73 Section 55, “Requirements for physical
protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage,”
(10 CFR 73.55).
Security orders EA-02-026 and EA-03-086 were included in new and updated
security regulations and guidance to licensees though the update of 10 CFR 73.55 on
March 27, 2009. A part of this update, in subsection (f), is the first codification of target
sets for a commercial nuclear reactor facility. Initial guidance to meet the requirements
for target sets was published in RG 5.76, “Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear
Power Reactors” in July 2009, but was limited in scope and detail. Expanded NRC
guidance on meeting the new target set requirements was not published until November
2010, when the NRC staff issued RG 5.81.
RG 5.81 expanded greatly on what was previously available, providing more
detail on documentation and thoroughness, especially concerning operator actions, plant
operation modes, cyber-attacks and flooding and fire impacts. Though not determined to
be an increase in regulatory scope, RG 5.81 outlined an expanded view of NRC staff
expectations on meeting the new Target Set requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 published in
2009. RG 5.81 stressed the traceability of a target set’s origin, to understand the original
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safety basis and analysis for the inclusion of components and operator actions within the
target sets.

Relationship of Target Sets to Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RG 5.81 stresses the use of site safety basis documents in developing target sets,
specifically the usefulness of using a site’s Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA
is a thoroughly developed and vetted tool that captures most of the equipment failure
combinations that lead to core damage. The equipment combinations found in the PRA
have an overlap with those found in target sets, and thus the PRA can be considered a
natural starting point in developing target sets. There exist key differences between
PRAs and target sets in the treatment and representation of several factors that must be
considered when using a PRA to create target sets. PRAs and target sets differ on:
initiating events, failure probabilities, component failure modes, inclusion of passive
components, operator actions, non-safety related components, mitigating systems,
flooding, fire, and cyber security.
PRA uses initiating events as the starting point for events that challenge the safety
of the plant. These initiating events require the use of safety systems to return the reactor
to a safe condition. Examples of PRA initiating events are: loss of coolant accident
(LOCA), loss of offsite power (LOOP), and reactor protection system (RPS) trip.
Initiating events in the PRA begin the challenge to the plant, and thus occur first
chronologically. Target sets do not use an initiating event per se, in that the destruction
or compromise of target elements does not need to occur in any specific order, and thus
no target is necessarily “first,” but one target element of each set must challenge the
safety of the plant if the adversary wishes to cause core damage.
A PRA is composed of event trees that begin with initiating events. The event
trees contain markers for systems whose failure or success determines the state of the
reactor. Figure 3 through Figure 7 (in the appendix) show examples of event trees for
several initiating events. The systems contained in the event trees are then modeled in
individual fault trees, to represent the failure modes of the system with individual
3

components. Figure 8 through Figure 23 (in the appendix) show examples of the fault
trees associated with the systems represented in the event trees of Figure 3 through Figure
7. Each different component failure combination, starting with an initiating event and
including components from each applicable fault tree, is represented by a cutset. Each
component in the fault trees has associated failure probabilities, and these probabilities
are summed to give a failure probability for each cutset. In this way, PRA can determine
those pieces of equipment that provide the greatest contribution of risk to a system or
reactor. Target sets do not use failure probabilities, and instead assume that if an
adversary reaches a target with the time and capability to compromise or destroy that
target, then the target is compromised or lost. Target sets should consider if targets are
“achievable,” that the adversary is capable of compromising or destroying the target. For
example, if the target is a 24” steel reinforced concrete wall, and the adversary is
equipped with a manual chisel, the target could be declared “unachievable” and justified
with an analysis on the time required to defeat the wall. Adversary characteristics are
detailed in RG 5.69, “Guidance for the Application of Radiological Sabotage DesignBasis Threat in the Design, Development and Implementation of a Physical Security
Program that Meets 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements.”
PRAs will analyze different failure modes for components within fault trees. For
example, a pump could fail by having a seal fail, having an incomplete electrical
connection within the motor housing, or having a bearing failure. These different failure
modes are often included separately within a PRA, as the different failure modes have
different failure probabilities that contribute to the failure probability of the pump.
Target sets do not consider different failure modes, as after the adversary reaches a target
element, many different failures options exist, and thus an adversary reaching a target
element is considered bounding. Target sets should consider different compromise states
of components, as an adversary could cause a system to work against the safety of the
plant (for example, activing a pump to remove coolant water from the reactor coolant
system and dump it outside the building).
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Internal event PRAs analyze the failure probability associated with random
failures of active Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) (pumps, valves, etc…)
within the site itself, and external event PRAs consider the effect of external events
(winds, seismic events, external flooding) on SSCs within the plant. The internal events
PRA usually does not consider the random failure of passive components (pipes, tanks,
and flood and fire barriers). External events PRAs do include many of these passive
components (as their failure is considered under the effect of specific conditions). Target
sets fully include, with equal weight, passive components, as an adversary could attack
passive or active component to the same effect.
A PRA will consider operator actions as events in a fault tree with human
reliability of making mistakes or forgetting intentional actions in mind. Target sets also
consider operator actions, but require that they meet six criteria set forth in RG 5.81
section 6.4 in order to be credited in target sets: “(1) sufficient time is available to
implement these actions, (2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, (3)
adversary interference is precluded, (4) any equipment needed to complete these actions
is available and ready for use, (5) approved procedures exist which have entering
conditions outside of severe accident mitigation guidelines (SAMG) or equivalent, and
(6) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the
scenario assumed.” Target sets require greater guarantees on the completion of operator
actions as random failures/mistakes are not taken into account. Operator actions are
considered target elements, and the equipment, operator, or environment for the action
could all be determined to be separate targets associated with one operator action.
A PRA is primarily composed of safety-related pieces of equipment, but can
include non-safety related pieces of equipment if they are deemed risk significant.
Similarly, target sets are primarily composed of safety-related equipment, but can also
include non-safety related equipment. SSCs, such as extra purpose-positioned pumps,
hose, and water sources for emergency makeup water addition to the reactor could be
included within target sets.
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A level 2 PRA addresses the probability, size and timing of offsite releases
following core damage. Those SSCs that are included within the level 2 PRA are those
that would limit or mitigate damage and release, including the containment structure,
valves, filters, and environmental control systems. Target sets focus on SSCs that lead to
significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage, and do not consider containment or
mitigating systems.
The internal and external event PRAs consider the effect of flooding on plant
safety systems. For internal events, flooding from active and traditional sources (pumps,
LOCAs, etc.) is considered with the expected performance of interior flood barriers.
External event PRAs consider expected external flooding based on the flooding history of
the surrounding area. Target sets should consider interior or exterior flooding from a
multitude of sources. As adversaries can defeat flood barriers and cause flooding in
previously unanalyzed areas, target sets should consider flooding/water damage far
beyond what is found in the PRA.
A fire PRA may be conducted (consistent with National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 805) for internal or external events. Similar to flooding, a fire PRA
would consider only traditional fire ignition sources with the expected performance of
fire barriers. Target sets should consider the effects of fire beyond the PRA, as an
adversary could cause a fire where accessible and use incendiary devices and flammable
materials to propagate the fire across fire barriers.
PRAs analyze random failures of SSCs and operators, and not malicious actions,
thus cyber-attacks are not considered in PRA. Target sets must consider cyber-attacks on
any component susceptible to such an attack, consistent with 10 CFR 73.54, “Protection
of digital computer and communication systems and networks” and RG 5.71, “Cyber
Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities.”
A site’s PRA provides many of the different equipment and component
combinations found as the result of target set development, but several key differences do
not allow the direct translation from PRA cut-sets to target sets. These differences
require that PRA and target sets exist as separate tools produced through separate
6

methods, but allow the use of PRA (in addition to other documents and analyses) to
inform target sets.
The Challenge of Target Sets
Though the new regulation in 2009 was a codification of previous Security
Orders, and by definition, Regulatory Guides are not requirements (they are the NRC
staff’s example of an acceptable method to meet regulation), the new regulations in 10
CFR 73.55(f) and issue of RG 5.81 communicate from the Staff that in order to meet
regulation, a large effort from licensees is required to develop and maintain their target
sets.
10 CFR 73.55(f) requires that licensees: document and maintain the process to
develop and identify target sets; consider cyber security in target sets; document those
target set elements that are not located within a protected or vital area; and that changes
to the plant are considered in target sets and accounted for in the protective strategy.
These requirements are challenging for licensees to meet due to the voluminous and
complex nature of nuclear plant safety analyses. Development and management of target
sets is done largely by hand using word processing and spreadsheet software. Each
change to the target sets must be manually entered and updated throughout the
documentation. Updating target sets to reflect site conditions or changes is open to delay,
error, or accidental omission due to the onerous nature of updating every document.
Though NRC and industry guidance exists, execution of target set development is left to
the licensee with limited review, possibly exposing the target sets to accidental omission,
errors, or obfuscation of data. There are no computer programs specifically designed for
target sets, and target sets differ from PRA enough such that current PRA codes have
only limited usefulness for target sets.
This report will outline the requirements for a computer code system (computer
program) for the development and maintenance of target sets. The proposed program
would allow the populating and updating of target set data with commonly used nuclear
industry safety data codes, provide a step by step process for users to add to and enrich
entered data, provide multiple standard and user generated grouping and sorting options
7

for users to identify certain aspects of the target sets, and provide several report
generating and data output paths. This program would have applicability to US and
international commercial, research and government reactor and nuclear facilities.
Additionally, this program would apply to any complex facility or system that requires
protection from sabotage and uses a fault-tree program. The goal of the program would
be to reduce costs associated with target set development and maintenance while
providing a more accurate and insightful product for use in developing a facility’s
protective strategy.
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Chapter 2
Program Description
The primary purpose of the program is to guide users to use information that is
already available as a part of their licensing basis to populate target set data within a
database to allow easy editing, sorting and grouping. The program would be a tool to be
used in the development of target sets. The program will populate target set data
originally from PRA software, such as SAPHIRE and CAFTA cut set data sheets.
Additional information will need to be entered manually from other data sources (e.g.
safe shutdown list) either for each individual component or by a grouped set of
components. By using results and analyses from previously reviewed and verified safety
analyses to form the target sets, the most accurate and thorough representation of the
reactor systems can be used to inform the protective strategy. After the population of
several different component parameters (component type, location, system, etc…),
sorting and grouping of the target set components would be accomplished by several
standard and user-defined options. The program will have the ability to mark some target
elements (through the sorting and filtering options) as unavailable, to represent systems,
trains or equipment in maintenance, outage, or under special circumstance, and the
updated target sets that result from the change. The program would have several standard
and custom user generated reports for printing or exportation. The program is intended
as a unique tool to use in the development and continued maintenance of target sets.

Target Set Development Process
Outlined in RG 5.81, the target set development process seeks to provide steps for
the identification and development of target sets: 1. Establish Target Set Analysis Team,
2. Determine Objectives, 3. Identify Target Elements, 4. Generate Target Sets, and 5.
Screen for Achievable Targets.
Step 1 of the target set analysis (TSA) process is to form a team of individuals
knowledgeable in: reactor engineering, plant systems and design, plant operations,
structural design, PRA, physical security, cyber security, and maintenance. Team
9

expertise in these areas would provide the individual knowledge and experience to inform
the development of target sets.
Step 2 of the TSA is to determine the objective of the analysis. For a nuclear
power plant, prevention of significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage are the primary
objectives. Lesser objectives could include redundant safety system availability, or
mitigating and containment system availability (though not required for TSA).
Step 3 of the TSA process is identification of target elements. Target elements
can be determined from examination of existing safety-related equipment lists and system
descriptions. Equipment in the PRA would also likely be included as target elements.
The goal of target element identification is to include in the TSA those SSCs that have a
safety basis or purpose to the plant. The inclusion in target sets of non-safety related
SSCs provides a greater safety defense-in-depth against adversary attack.
Step 4 of the TSA process is target set generation, the identification of equipment
combinations that lead to core damage. A PRA could provide many of the equipment
combinations required for target sets, but additional SSCs, operator actions, and
combinations would be required beyond the PRA to accomplish this step.
Step 5 of the TSA is to screen the target sets for achievable targets. Some targets
may be beyond the capabilities of the adversary, and thus need not be included for
consideration in target sets. The characteristics of the adversary are found in RG 5.69.
The intention of the proposed computer program would be to assist in steps 3 and
4 by using PRA to populate the target elements and SSC combinations in target sets.
Consistent with step 3 and 4, additional information from many additional sources is
required to be entered by the user to complete the target sets. The computer program
would provide a large basis via the importation of PRA data, and flexible framework to
continue development of target sets with the inclusion of other user-entered data such as:
equipment types, locations, systems, flood, fire and cyber-attack susceptibility, and
additional SSCs not found in the PRA. The computer program would provide the proper
functionality and reporting options required by target set development and maintenance
and not offered in other existing programs.
10

Program Method of Use
The program is designed to be used within the TSA framework given in RG 5.81.
Documentation that accompanies the program would provide a step-by-step process on
the use of the program to develop and update target sets. The process for the creation of
new target sets in the program is shown below:

1. Acquire Basis Documents
2. Import cut sets from PRA data file
3. Complete target element and target set data
4. Add or delete target elements and target sets
5. Group/mask target elements
6. Create challenge scenarios
7. Review of target set development
8. Report target set insights

The attributes of each step will be described in the following sections, and
examples are given in Chapter 4 of this document.

Program Architecture
The program will be a database with a graphical user interface. The program will
be password protected with encrypted data files for additional security, and will be
designed to be used on a stand-alone machine or network in accordance with regulations
on the protection of Safeguards Information and National Security Information. The
program will have the ability to have several user profiles that access only the program
data permitted to each user (data sharing between profiles will be non-simultaneous, and
will be allowed though mutual authentication with the ability to revoke). By default, user
profiles will be fully accessible only by the owner of the user profile and the program
administrator. The program will log all access, files exported or printed, and changes for
lengths of time determined by the administrator. The program will use temporary files
11

while open, and auto-save to the original files at predesignated points or at user request
(to prevent corruption of the saved data should a fault or error occur).
The program will have two “frames.” The “build frame” is where the user will
build and modify the target sets and target elements (target sets are comprised of target
elements). The “challenge frame” is where the user can build scenarios that challenge the
plant. In the “challenge frame,” no permanent editing or changes to the target sets or
target elements will be possible, but challenge scenarios could be designed and saved,
and would automatically update when the data is edited and saved in the “build frame.”
The system administrator or data owner will decide if users will have access to the “build
frame,” “challenge frame,” or both.

Target Set Basis Documents
Though the program is built around using cut sets from a PRA program,
additional information is required to populate the information fields in the data files and
add target elements and sets that are not represented in the site’s PRA. The program
would provide specific guidance to documents and tables that should be included in the
development of target sets. RG 5.81 provides guidance on the types of documents and
tables that the NRC Staff would expect to be reviewed and used in the development of
target sets (this information is not given here as some is deemed Official Use Only –
Security Related Information). To facilitate the use of these documents, the program
would provide a Bibliography Table feature that would allow the entry of document
names, tables, and figures that possess the information referenced for the creation of
target sets. Additionally, under each bibliographic entry, a separate field would be
available to enter what information was excluded and an explanation to the omission.
This function exists to provide transparency and traceability to the target set development
process, so the disposition of systems, structures, and components deemed important in
the facility safety analysis can be determined for the development of target sets.
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Importing PRA Files
In the “build frame,” the program will give the option to import a document of
PRA cut sets in either the SAPHIRE or CAFTA format, as these are the codes primarily
used in the commercial nuclear industry. The capability will exist to add additional PRA
formats at a later time to encompass other risk assessment software. After the user
selects the PRA program file for import, the program will automatically begin populating
target set and target element data files in the database with each cut set and cut set
component. Each cut set, upon transformation to a target set, would have a unique
identification number assigned. Each target element derived from cut sets would be
automatically assigned a unique ID number and name (derived from cut set component
name). Duplicate cut sets will be ignored, and only unique cut sets will be captured as
target sets. Duplicate target element entries will also be ignored except for logging their
associated cut sets. The result of importing the PRA cut sets is to capture those
relationships and form preliminary target sets.
The program will also have the capability to update with a new import of a PRA
cut set document in the same way the initial data import function occurred, by checking
and ignoring duplicates. In this way, updates to a site’s PRA could be reflected within
the site’s target sets via an automatic process.

Target Set and Target Element Data Files
As the result of importing data from a PRA cut set data file, the program will have
initial target set and target element data files populated. The target set data files will
have: their identifying ID #, and the full set of target elements imported from the PRA cut
set data file. The target elements will have: their identifying ID #; their identifying name;
and the full list of target set ID#s to which that target element belongs. The target
element and target set “ID#s” are unique identifiers assigned by the program upon
creation of the data file.
In the “build frame,” if no PRA cut set data file is imported, or there are
additional target sets or target elements to add, the user can create a new target element
13

and enter all values manually. The user can then form target sets from the existing target
elements.
Target element data files would contain the information fields listed in Table 1,
column 1 and the target set data files would contain the information fields listed in Table
1, column 2. From the PRA import step, those fields that are underlined in Table 1 would
be filled automatically. The remaining fields require that the user enter the data.
In the “build frame,” the target elements can be displayed in the “Element Build
List” and the target sets in the “Set Build List.” The “Build Lists” could be filtered,
sorted, and searched. The lists will have columns for attributes of target elements and
target sets, and will be edited individually or in user selected groups. In this way, the
data associated with many target elements and target sets will be able to be populated in a
fast and efficient manner. The standard column headers for the target element and target
set lists are located in bold in Table 1 column 1 and column 2 (respectively).

Table 1: Data File Information Fields
Target Element
Data file
ID#
IDName
Name
Type
Location
Modes
Train
System
Cyber?
Flood?
Fire?
Operator?
Target Sets

Target Set
Data File
ID#

# Elements
# Locations
Modes
Train(s)
Systems
Cyber?
Flood?
Fire?
Operator?
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Descriptions of the data file fields are:
-

“IDName” field would be automatically be derived during import from cut
set files, entered by the user, or edited by the user.

-

“Type” field would be used to classify the type target element equipment,
component or action with a standard library of terms (pipe, valve,
switchgear, cable, etc…) or the option for user-defined terms. This
information would be useful to users to understand what type of component
is represented (as it may not be obvious given the name of the target
element). The types listed will be links to the “Element Build List” with the
list filtered to only those elements of the type selected.

-

“# Elements” field would compile the number of target elements that
comprise the target set. This information would be useful in sorting and
filtering target sets. Providing the target sets with the fewest targets may
provide a useful insight for the protective strategy.

-

“Location” field would be user defined, but would identify the component
location (room) within the site. The “# Locations” field would display the
compiled number of distinct locations of target elements from that target set.
Providing the target sets with the fewest locations may provide a useful
insight for the protective strategy. The locations listed will be links to the
“Element Build List” with the list filtered to only those elements contained
within the location selected.

-

“Mode” and “Modes” fields would list the modes of reactor operation that
the target element and target set are applicable to. Target sets are required
to represent all modes of operation. A specific reactor’s modes of operation
are defined in a site’s Technical Specifications. Generic modes of
operation, numbered 1-7 are as follows: Power Operation, Startup, Hot
Standby, Cold Standby, Shutdown, Refueling, and Reduced Inventory
Conditions. (RG 5.81)
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-

“Train” field would list the designated train that the target element belongs
to. The “Train(s)” field would display the compiled trains associated with
that target set. This information would be useful to understand the target
sets when trains are taken out of service for maintenance. The trains listed
will be links to the “Element Build List” with the list filtered to only those
elements contained within the train selected.

-

“System” field would list the associated system that the target element
belongs to. The “Systems” field would display the compiled systems
associated with that target set. This information would be useful to
understand the target sets when systems are taken out of service for
maintenance. The systems listed will be links to the “Element Build List”
with the list filtered to only those elements contained within the system
selected.

-

The “Cyber?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element is
susceptible to a cyber-attack (consistent with the guidance in NRC RG 5.71,
“Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities”). The “Cyber?” field for
the target set data field would compile and display the fraction of target
elements that are susceptible to a cyber-attack.

-

The “Flood?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element is
susceptible to damage from flooding. The “Flood?” field for the target set
data field would compile and display the fraction of target elements that are
susceptible to flooding.

-

The “Fire?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element is
susceptible to damage from fire. The “fire?” field for the target set data
field would compile and display the fraction of target elements that are
susceptible to fire.

-

The “Operator?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element or
target set requires an operator action outside the main control room for its
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success or “No”. For target sets, the “Operator?” field would sum the
required operator actions of the target set.
-

The “Target Set” field for the target element data file would list every target
set ID# (as links to the target set data files) that the target element is
contained within. The target sets listed would be links to the data file of the
selected target set.

The program will have the capability of adding user-created and defined fields for
the target elements and target set data files. These custom fields could also be added to
the “Element Build List” and “Set Build List” for custom user-defined parameters for
sorting.
The program will have a copy/paste window for target sets and target elements.
Copied target sets and elements that are then pasted would have placeholder names and
new ID#s, so that expansion of the target sets and target elements can occur based on
selected existing data. For example, if a target set contained 5 elements, and the user
wanted to make a new target set with 4 elements being the same and one new element,
then the original set could be copied, the 5 elements would remain in the new target set
while in the copy/paste window. The undesired element would then be removed, and a
new target element would then be added. The target element list would then not be
updated with the new 5th element until the copied target set was “published,” and the
copy/paste window exited.
The “build frame” would have standard reporting and printing options, using the
“Element Build List” and “Set Build List” to filter, sort, and search those target elements
and target sets for reports and printing. The intention of the “build frame” printing would
be for target set development and maintenance purposes.

Challenge Frame
The “challenge frame” of the program is where the useful insights should be
determined to inform the protective strategy. The intention of separating the “build
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frame” from the “challenge frame” is multifaceted. First, the “challenge frame” would
not allow users to edit the base data of the program. This would provide a safe space for
users to design different scenarios of equipment availability without the worry of
compromising the base data. Second, it provides for information compartmentalization.
It may be that the users that build the target sets do not need to know the details on the
Design Basis Threat and other threat characteristics that are used to challenge a plant.
Third, the “challenge window” will have functionality that would impede the target set
development. In the “challenge frame,” filtering, grouping, and masking (replacing
values with a placeholder) of elements could be saved. In the “build frame,” filtering,
sorting, and grouping would be for the session only, and also could be reset by the user
during a session.
The “challenge frame” will have the ability for the user to filter, sort and mask
data in order to derive useful conclusions from the data. The “Element Build List” and
“Set Build List” are replaced with the “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List”
and retain the bold columns from Table 20 (in the Appendix) as well as the capacity for
custom user generated fields. The “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List” could
be filtered and sorted, and the results saved so different scenarios could be modeled. In
this way, the target sets could easily model scenarios like: having a train out of service;
reactor in cold stand-by mode; refueling outage; or other planned maintenance. Target
elements could also be masked to simplify the target sets. For example, all target
elements in the control room could be masked as “control room” to act as a single target.
The mask on the target elements would possess a data file like the target elements and
target sets, and would display the same information as target elements with the addition
of a list of all target elements it masks.
The “challenge frame” will have standard and custom user-generated reporting
and printing options. The standard reports would detail information such as: the smallest
target sets; the target sets with the fewest locations; the target sets with the largest cyber
vulnerability (highest % of target elements that have cyber vulnerability); the target sets
with the largest flood vulnerability; the target sets with the largest fire vulnerability; and
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the target sets that rely on operator action outside the main control room. The user could
also use the “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List” to develop and save custom
reporting options.

Validation and Review
Initial validation of the computer code would be accomplished through the use of
a prepared standard cutset data file and instructions for the user. The user would
complete the example to test all of the code components, and the resulting target sets
could then be compared against published results. The validation materials would
include documentation on variations in the results, and likely sources for deviation from
the correct results.
User, peer, and regulatory review of the target sets would be possible through the
previously described reporting options (of individual or groups of target elements and
target sets, or of all target set data). Review of the documents and comments contained
within the program’s Bibliographic Table would provide the basis for inclusion or
exclusion of SSCs, which could then be traced to the target elements and target sets.
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Chapter 3
Method of Demonstration
To illustrate the benefits of a program as described above, a small demonstration
of the method can be performed without the large scope of producing the actual computer
code program. To demonstrate the methods of the program, a PRA is required. For
greater clarity, a PRA is constructed with simplified reactor systems and system
interdependencies.

Nuclear Power Facility Model
For the reactor model, a Pressurized Power Reactor (PWR) is selected as they are
the most numerous commercial reactor design used today. The design is roughly based
on the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) four-loop PWR, however, the design is
simplified such that creation of target sets does not approach a realistic representation of
any former, current or future commercial nuclear reactor, nor would the information be
useful to an adversary, and thus does not constitute information that should be withheld
from public viewing. The model reactor is named the Simplified Generic Nuclear Plant
(SGNP).
The SGNP reactor model is simplified from the Westinghouse four-coolant loop
PWR to a two loop PWR with two safety trains. Using the system descriptions and
diagrams in the WEC document, “The Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Nuclear
Power Plant,” a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) was created to represent the
reactor facility. This P&ID can be found in the Appendix as Figure 2 and shows the
primary coolant systems: the reactor coolant system (RCS), main steam supply system
(MSSS), the emergency feedwater system (EFW), the high head safety injection (HHSI)
system, and the residual heat removal (RHR) system.
The location of equipment is only specified to the building as a simplification
from individually locked rooms on separate levels of a building. It is assumed that each
building is separated by a locked flood and fire barrier.
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Using the system descriptions, system interdependencies are determined and
captured in Table 2. Basic representations of the support systems are modeled for the
SGNP.

Table 2: System Interdependencies
System
EDGs
x
x
x

RCS
RHR
HHSI
EDGs
CCW
x
EFW
x
Service Water
Condensers

Dependent Upon
Service Circulating
CCW Water Water
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

The primary coolant systems rely on the emergency diesel generators (EDGs), the
component cooling water (CCW) system, the service water system, and the circulating
water system. The system dependencies are simplified for ease of use (to one or two
items), as actual nuclear power facilities have much greater redundancies and
interdependent relationships between systems.
The chemical and volume control system (CVCS), which provides boration and
can partially contribute makeup water, is not included in the model. Though the
pressurizer is included in the P&ID, the pressurizer and the associated pressure operated
relief valve are not modeled for reactor coolant inventory modeling simplification. As
the CVCS cannot contribute water to the reactor coolant system at a rate to meet safety
requirements for a LOCA, boration was not considered, and the pressurizer was not
considered, the CVCS is determined to be unnecessary to model.
The power systems modeled are the EDGs, the switchyard, and offsite power.
These components are selected to simplify target locations and electrical system
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component and to demonstrate some simple system dependencies and redundancies for
the electrical systems. Offsite power and EDGs are the primary load bearing safety
electrical systems, and both route through the common switchyard. Switchgear, class 1E
batteries, and non-safety electrical systems were not modeled, and this assumption does
not pose any negative impact on the model. These components are omitted from the
model as their locations are numerous and they also support separate trains and systems,
which would complicate the reactor model.
The reactor protection system (RPS) (plant safety computer), instrumentation and
control systems, and reactor reactivity systems (control rods and boration) are not
modeled, but a successful control rod insertion is assumed when needed (consistent with
reactivity control requirements). Though the RPS would likely be the primary target for
a cyber-attack, plant instrumentation and control systems are too numerous to model for
this example. It is assumed that a reactor trip initiates automatically or manually and
successfully signals equipment to actuate.
Operator actions are not modeled for the PRA, but the possibility of operator
action was left as an option with the manually controlled steam line A and B condenser
and atmospheric dump valves.
Other plant systems that are not modeled, but were assumed to have no negative
effects on plant performance were: containment isolation valves, heating ventilations and
cooling systems (HVAC), containment spray systems, check valves, and the spent fuel
pool and associated systems. Containment isolation, HVAC, and containment spray
systems are omitted as these systems are typically excluded from target set analysis, and
thus would provide little benefit for this demonstration. Check valves are excluded for
simplicity of the model design. The spent fuel pool is not considered as the complexities
of the reactor systems provide a better example for the demonstration of the program
methods.
The reactor modeled is assumed to be at full power operation, with no equipment
out of service. Though other reactor modes can rely on fewer pieces of equipment to
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cool the reactor, full-power operation is chosen as it challenges more systems of the plant
for the demonstration.

PRA Model of the SGNP
From the Figure 2 P&ID found in the appendix, system dependencies in Table 2,
and system descriptions found in WEC documentation, the initiating events, event trees
and fault trees for the PRA are formed for the SGNP using the SAPHIRE 7 PRA code.
Five initiating events are explored for the SGNP: steam line break in loop A (SLA-Break), steam line break in loop B (SL-B-Break), RPS trip (RPS-TRIP), small break
loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) in the RCS (reactor coolant system) (RCSSBLOCA), and large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) in the RCS (RCSLBLOCA). These initiating events represent common challenges to the reactor operation
that pose significant challenges.
The SL-A-Break and SL-B-Break initiating events are similar but occur in
opposite secondary cooling loops between the steam generators and turbines. These
initiating events challenge the plant by the loss of secondary coolant loop inventory, and
thus there is greater reliance on the opposing secondary cooling loop or shutdown and
cooling systems.
The RPS-TRIP event represented the actuation of shutdown systems of the
reactor. The RPS-TRIP initiating event challenges the ability to remove heat from the
primary coolant loop through the use the secondary coolant systems, and not through the
injection of cool water from the safety injection systems. The RPS-TRIP event was
assumed to be bounding for LOOP, turbine trip, and reactor coolant pump trip, as they
would result in a RPS-initiated trip. LOOP and loss of steam loop functionality are found
within the fault trees of the events of the RPS-TRIP initiating event.
The RCS-SBLOCA initiating event challenges the plant to cool the reactor with at
least one safety injection system. The RCS-LBLOCA initiating event challenges the
plant to cool the reactor with the minimum of at least one accumulator and one high-head
safety injection system. The LOCA initiating events are standard events that challenge
23

the plant to cool the reactor by keeping enough cool water to flow through the reactor by
the use of the safety injection and RHR systems.
For each initiating event, event trees were created that represented the major
coolant systems required to function in response to each initiating event. The results of
reactor “OK” status and core damage “CD” are determined by the event trees. The “OK”
status denotes a safe final reactor conditions, and the “CD” status indicates the failure of
safety systems that result in core damage. Figure 3 through Figure 7 (in the appendix)
show the event trees modeled for the SGNP.
The SGNP event tree models are simplified by having only two possibilities:
“Actuates” and “Fails.” “Actuates” is taken to mean that the action / component / system
occurs/operates as desired and at a sufficient level. “Fails” is taken to mean that the
action / component / system does not meet the required level of action by either inaction,
undesired action, or insufficient action.
Failure of the events in the event trees are determined by their associated fault
trees. Figure 8 through Figure 23 (in the appendix) illustrate the fault trees for the SGNP.
The fault trees differ from most internal event PRAs as they consider the failure of
passive components (pipes and tanks), and not just the failure of active components
(valves, pumps, etc…). Each fault tree was formed from understanding the SSCs of each
system, and the systems they rely upon. The success criteria for the PRA was the
successful cooling of the reactor core to cold standby (through Mode 4 to achieve Mode
5, Shutdown), when the RHR system is required to cool the reactor, due to low
temperature and pressure. As the RHR system would be required to run for decay heat
removal, this success criteria would challenge the major cooling systems of the reactor
facility.
The failure combinations given by the fault trees and events in the event trees give
the cut sets for the SGNP. For the purposes of this demonstration failure probabilities
were not considered, so what remains are all possible failure paths to core damage for the
SGNP, 169,115 different cut sets, with the largest cut sets having 10 different
components. As this number of cut sets is unwieldy, ten cut sets were selected to use for
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demonstration, six with RPS trip as the initiating event, two with a steam line break in
loop A as the initiating event, and two with a LBLOCA as the initiating event. These ten
cut sets are shown in Figure 1, in the report format from the SAPHIRE 7 PRA program.
As a note: the model of the reactor and systems in the PRA applies only to the
simulated reactor facility and do not approach the complexity and redundancy of an
actual nuclear reactor design. The descriptions provided for the cut sets apply to the
model only, and are not intended to provide an account of actual reactor system,
component, or procedure performance or capabilities.

END STATE CUT SETS REPORT
Project: SGNP

Case : Current

Analysis: RANDOM

Units: Per Year

End State Cut Set # Events Count Inputs
CD 7 2 RPS-TRIP, CCW-COMP-FAIL
14 3 RCS-LBLOCA, ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-A, ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B
30 3 RCS-LBLOCA, HHSI-A-PUMP-UNIT-FAIL, HHSI-B-PUMP-UNIT-FAIL
201 3 RPS-TRIP, RHR-A-HX-UNIT-FAIL, RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL
710 4 RPS-TRIP, EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS, EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS, LOOP
928 4 SL-A-BREAK, CCW-COMP-FAIL, COND-B-FAIL, EFW-A-MP-FAIL
1360 5 RPS-TRIP, FW-A-MP-FAIL, FW-B-MP-FAIL, VT2A-Fail, VT2B-Fail
3062 RPS-TRIP, COND-A-FAIL, COND-B-FAIL, EFW-A-MP-FAIL, EFW-A-SP-FAIL, VT2B-Fail
3666 6 RPS-TRIP, EFW-A-MP-FAIL, EFW-A-SP-FAIL, FW-A-MP-FAIL, FW-B-MP-FAIL, VT2BFAIL
9757 6 SL-A-BREAK, SWITCHYARD-FAIL, VE2A-FAIL, VE3A-FAIL, VS2A-FAIL, VS2B-FAIL
2014/08/02 Page # 19:01:01
Model Rev. ----/--/--

Figure 1: Selected PRA Cut Sets
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Cut set 7 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the
reactor and the failure of the CCW system. This cut set led to core damage as upon RPS
trip, safety systems are required to bring the reactor to a shutdown state. The component
cooling water system provides the cooling to systems required to control the reactor.
Without the proper cooling, these systems fail, stopping the cooling systems to the
reactor, and leading to core damage.
Cut set 14 consists of a large break in the reactor coolant system, and failures of
both of the accumulator injections lines. Upon a large break loss of coolant accident,
additional water inventory is required to be added to the reactor coolant system to cool
the reactor. This coolant is injected into the cold leg of the RCS through the accumulator
injection lines. If the accumulator injection lines fail, there is no other method of
providing additional coolant into the reactor vessel, and thus leads to core damage.
Cut set 30 consists of a large break in the reactor coolant system and failures of
both high head safety injection pumps. As a large break loss of coolant accident results
in a large amount of coolant inventory being relocated to the floor of the containment
building during full-power operation, a large volume of coolant is required to replace it in
a short time span. As such, the injection of at least one accumulator and one high head
safety injection pump is required to provide the coolant inventory until the reactor cools
enough for the residual heat removal system to take over the coolant inventory
circulatory function. The loss of both high head safety injection pumps prevents the
required water inventory from entering the reactor core, and thus leads to core damage.
Cut set 201 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the
reactor and failures of both residual heat removal heat exchangers. Upon RPS trip,
control rods insert and reduce the reactor reactivity and cooling systems reduce the
reactor coolant temperature. When the reactor coolant temperature is low enough, longterm cooling is facilitated by the residual heat removal systems, of which at least one is
required. In this cut set, the loss of both RHR heat exchanges leads to no heat removal
from the reactor coolant system and thus core damage.

26

Cut set 710 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the
reactor, loss of both emergency diesel generators, and a loss of offsite power. In order
for safety systems to bring the reactor to shut down and continue removal of decay heat,
electrical power is required to run instrumentation and control equipment, (most) valves,
and pumps. The loss of offsite power means no electricity is reaching the site to power
equipment, and thus the use of on-site emergency diesel generators is required to provide
power to plant equipment. The loss of offsite power and the emergency diesel generators
leads to core damage as there is no electricity to monitor the reactor or systems or to run
any equipment to cool the reactor.
Cut set 928 consists of a break in the steam or feedwater line of loop A, loss of
component cooling water, loss of condenser B, and loss of motor-driven emergency
feedwater pump A. For the model, the reactor can safely reach shutdown with one
operational steam line without the use of emergency equipment. In this cutset, steam line
A experiences a break, but makeup water cannot be added to steam loop A as the motor
driven pump of the emergency feedwater system has failed (and the steam driven pump is
unavailable in a steam line break in the same train). Steam loop B loses cooling function
as condenser B fails. Steam is then dumped to the atmosphere in steam loop B to cool
the reactor by way of a natural convective current within the RCS. The loss of
component cooling water incapacitates the residual heat removal system, meaning when
the reactor coolant cools below the capabilities of steam loop B, the natural convection
within the reactor coolant system slows and stops and leads to core damage.
Cut set 1360 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the
reactor, loss of feedwater pumps A and B, and failure of valves VT2A and VT2B for
steam dump to the atmosphere. Upon reactor trip, the turbines are tripped as well,
removing their heat removal function. The loss of feedwater pumps A and B removes the
ability to dump steam to condensers to remove heat. The failure (closing) of valves
VT2A and VT2B closes the pathway for the steam dump to the atmosphere. With the
steam/feedwater loops unable to remove heat with the condensers or through steam
dump, no heat is removed from the reactor coolant system, resulting in core damage.
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Cut set 3062 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the
reactor, loss of condensers A and B, loss of motor driven emergency feedwater pump A,
loss of steam driven emergency feedwater pump A, and failure of valve VT2B for steam
dump to the atmosphere. Upon reactor trip, the turbines are tripped as well, removing
their heat removal function. The failure of the condensers to function requires that heat
be removed from the core via dumping steam to the atmosphere. Failure of both the
motor-driven and steam-driven emergency feedwater pumps in loop A prevents any
makeup water being added to the loop and the loss of heat removal functions of that loop.
The failure (closing) of valve VT2B closes the pathway for the steam dump to the
atmosphere for loop B. The loss of makeup water for steam dump in loop A, and closing
of the pathway for steam dump in loop B results in no heat removal functions large
enough to cool the reactor core, and thus core damage.
Cut set 3666 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the
reactor, loss of motor driven emergency feedwater pump A, loss of steam-driven
emergency feedwater pump A, loss of feedwater pumps A and B, and failure of valve
VT2B for steam dump to the atmosphere. Upon reactor trip, the turbines are tripped as
well, removing their heat removal function. The failure of both feedwater pumps
removes any ability to cool the turbine/feedwater loop with the condensers. The loss of
both the motor-driven and steam-driven emergency feedwater pumps in loop A prevents
any makeup water being added to the loop and the loss of heat removal functions of that
loop. The failure (closing) of valve VT2B closes the pathway for the steam dump to the
atmosphere for loop B. The loss of makeup water for steam dump in loop A, and no
pathway for steam dump in loop B results in no heat removal functions large enough to
cool the reactor core, and thus core damage.
Cut set 9757 consists of a break in the steam or feedwater line of loop A, failure
of the switchyard, and the failure of valves VE2A, VE3A, VS2A, and VS2B. This cutset
demonstrates a partial success to cool the reactor. In this cutset, steam line A experiences
a break, but due to failure of the switchyard, turbine B trips as well, removing that heat
removal option. Though valves VE2A and VE3A fail, the motor operated emergency
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feedwater pump functions through operational valve VE1A, cooling the reactor coolant to
the point where the RHR system can take over cooling functions. This cutset leads to
core damage due to the failure of valves VS2A and VS2B, which prevent the RHR
system from providing a circulating current and cooling to the reactor coolant system.
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Chapter 4
Program Demonstration
The resulting cut sets from the PRA represent the failure combinations due to
random failures of equipment considered in the PRA. The program uploads this data
from the PRA to use as a starting point for the development of target sets. The addition
of data from other sources populates data fields that allow for the efficient sorting and
grouping of target elements and target sets.
Build Frame
Figure 1 is the cut set data file received from the SAPHIRE PRA model of the
SGNP. The program imports this SAPHIRE PRA cut sets, and populates data files for
the target sets and target elements. For example, Table 3 and Table 4are examples of
what the resulting data files would look like for a target element and a target set after
importing cut set 928 from Figure 1.

Table 3: Target Element #7.02 Data File after import
Target Element Data file
Attribute
Value
ID#
7.02
IDName
CCW-COMP-FAIL
Name
Type
Location
Modes
Train
System
Cyber?
Flood?
Fire?
Operator?
Target Sets 7, 928
* Data File Parameters are described after Table 1
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Table 4: Target Set #928 Data File after import
Target Set Data File
Attribute
Value
ID#
928
# Elements 4
# Locations
Modes
Train(s)
Systems
Cyber?
Flood?
Fire?
Operator?
Elements:
7.02, 928.01, 928.02, 928.03
* Data File Parameters are described after Table 1

Table 19Error! Reference source not found. (in the appendix) shows the
“Element Build List” after importing from the PRA data file. The occupied fields are
those that would be filled automatically by the program upon PRA data file import. The
empty fields need to be filled by the user.
The program takes the cutset data from the PRA to create most of the failure
combinations found in the target sets. It is up to the user to add to or remove from the
imported data to complete the target sets. After importing data from the PRA data file,
the remaining information is entered manually due to the non-standard nature of the
documents, figures, and tables that should be used to complete the data entry for the
target elements and target sets. The additional information is required to be entered to
provide the level of detail necessary to determine the insights desired of the target set
development process. This additional information is required for target set development
if a user has the program or not, but the program has means to expedite and replicate the
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data entry, and update with new data when plant changes occur. In this way, the entry of
this data needs to occur once, and then be maintained for the life of the design.
The program provides a means to catalog and comment upon the documents
required to provide the additional information beyond what is found in the PRA. Table 5
lists the bibliographic entries for the source documents used to fill in the remaining
information fields for the SGNP target elements and target sets. The documents listed in
Table 5 are some of the dozens that would need to be consulted to complete target sets.
Site PRAs would document different failure combinations that lead to different
undesirable consequences (e.g. core damage and/or radionuclide release) and most of the
safety related SSCs. Documentation related to the development of the PRAs would
outline system dependencies, success criteria, and criteria for component inclusion in the
PRA.
The site Safe Shutdown list would document those SSCs required to affect and
maintain reactor shutdown consistent with 10 CFR Part 50. Class 1E equipment is
defined as safety-related electrical equipment, consistent with The Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 323-1974, “IEEE Standard for
Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” Seismic
Category I SSCs are to be designed to withstand seismic events consistent with RG 1.29,
“Seismic Design Classification.” P&IDs illustrate system design and connections in a
graphical manner. Review of P&IDs and system walk downs may reveal equipment or
structures omitted from PRA activities. System Description documents would outline
and detail required and expected operating conditions of systems and equipment
performance. ite procedures and training manuals would provide details on those
operator actions accounted for in the site safety analysis. Further understanding of
operator actions would be required for target set development. The Cyber Security Plan
and Critical Digital Asset (CDA) List would detail the analyses conducted to determine
CDAs, and provide additional information on cyber security vulnerabilities not
considered in the PRA.
.
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Table 5: SGNP Bibliographic Table
Document
SGNP Level 1 PRA 5/3/14
SGNP Level 1 PRA development report
rev. 5
Safe Shut Down List rev. 45
Vital Equipment List rev. 11
Class 1E electrical power systems
Seismic Category I SSCs
P&ID RCS
RCS System Description and
Requirements
P&ID MSSS
MSSS System Description and
Requirements
P&ID EFW
EFW System Description and
Requirements
P&ID RHR
RHR System Description and
Requirements
P&ID SIS
SIS System Description and
Requirements
P&ID CCW
CCW System Description and
Requirements
Site Procedures - Reactor Operator
Actions
Site Training Manual - Reactor Operator

SGNP Cyber Security Plan
SGNP Critical Digital Asset List

Omission from target sets

Containment venting and filtering systems do
not meet the definition of TS equipment
Containment venting and filtering systems do
not meet the definition of TS equipment
Containment venting and filtering systems do
not meet the definition of TS equipment

Procedures for containment venting and
filtering systems do not meet the definition of
TS equipment
Training for containment venting and filtering
systems do not meet the definition of TS
equipment
CDAs that relate to containment venting and
filtering systems do not meet the definition of
TS equipment

* SIS: Safety Injection System

33

Table 5 shows documents with SSCs omitted from target sets. The definition of
target set is more restrictive than safety-related or vital equipment, as it does not include
the functions to mitigate or prevent any offsite releases after core damage or spent fuel
sabotage. Due to this difference, some systems and components would be expected on
safety-related and vital equipment lists and not in the target sets. Other omissions from
the target sets from safety-related equipment lists would be documented in a similar
manner to provide traceability on the inclusion and exclusion of equipment.
Using the documents in Table 5, we fill in the empty information fields in the
Target Element and Target Set Data Files. Easy updating of data would be accomplished
with the “Element Build List” through group selection and updating on the table. Table 6
and Table 7 show examples of data files after populating the information fields for target
element 7.02 and target set 928.
The population of data files with the new information provides the ability to sort
and group target elements and target sets for more data entry. Once all fields have been
completed, the user can then identify start to develop insights.

Table 6: Target Element #7.02 Data File with Complete Information Fields
Target Element Data file
Attribute
Value
7.02
ID#
CCW-COMP-FAIL
IDName
Comp. Cool Water
Name
Cool Sys.
Type
AUX
Location
1,2,3,4,5,6
Modes
Train
CCW
System
Y
Cyber?
N
Flood?
Y
Fire?
Operator? N
Target Sets 7, 928
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Table 7: Target Set #928 Data File with Complete Information Fields

Attribute
ID#
# Elements
# Locations
Modes
Train(s)
Systems
Cyber?
Flood?
Fire?
Operator?
Elements:

Target Set Data File
Value
928
4
3
MSSS A
MSSS B
CCW, MSSS A, MSSSB, EFW A
0.5
0.25
1
0
7.02, 928.01, 928.02, 928.03

After populating the information fields we find the complete “Set Build List” for
the “build frame” in Table 8.

Table 8: Set Build List in with Complete Information Fields
ID#
7
14
30
201
710
928
1360
3062
3666
9757

# elements
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
6
6
6

# location
2
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
2
4

Modes
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4,5,6
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4

Train(s) Cyber? Flood? Fire? Operator?
1
0.5
1
0
A, B
0.33
0
0.33
0
A, B
0.66
0.66
1
0
A, B
0.33
0.33
1
0
1
1
1
0
A, B
0.5
0.25
1
0
A, B
1
1
1
2
A, B
0.83
0.83
1
1
A, B
1
1
1
1
A, B
0.83
0.83
1
0

Table 8 shows several insights at this point. Every target set with 3+ targets has a
reduction in locations to fewer than the number of targets. Most target sets apply to
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conditions at power, and only one applies to shut down conditions. Most target sets
would be affected if a steam or safety train would be taken out of service. There exists a
possibility of whole target sets being susceptible to cyber-attack. Several target sets are
susceptible to flooding conditions. Almost all target sets are very susceptible to fire.
Cyber-attack, flooding and fire susceptibility are indicated by the fractional number of
elements in the target set that are susceptible to those types of attacks. Three target sets
have operator actions outside the main control room associated with them. Insights like
these should be examined in the “challenge frame” as the target sets are not yet fully
developed.
The updated and complete “Element Build List” for the “Build Frame” is shown
in Table 20 (in the appendix). Some information fields in Table 20 remain empty as
location or train designations may not apply, for example: the RPS-TRIP target element
could be accomplished in many different locations by many different methods (Operatorinitiated in the main control room (MCR), remote shutdown workstation (RSWS),
through manipulation of a sensor, through automatic initiation by the RPS after an
adversary attack on plant safety systems occurs, or through onsite or offsite adversary
action) and thus location information is inapplicable. Similarly, the LOOP target element
can be accomplished by an offsite adversary in locations not within the jurisdiction of the
site security force, and thus location information is inapplicable. Information on target
element “train” would primarily serve a purpose in the “challenge frame” to update target
sets when trains are taken out of service for maintenance. Many systems, structures and
components would not belong to a specific train.
The PRA provides an excellent starting point for target sets, but the differences
between PRA and target sets necessitates a review of system documentation to verify that
the components imported from the PRA are appropriate for target sets, and to add target
sets for components not found in the PRA. RG 5.81 provides guidance on the use of
PRA, additional documents, and clarification on some of the subtleties between PRA and
target sets.
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The creation of new data files is easiest when the PRA data has been fully
uploaded and information fields have been completed, as the program can copy existing
target elements for the purposes of creating new ones. For example, to represent a design
change at the SGNP of adding a valve to RHR loop A, before the RHR heat exchanger,
we pick to copy target element 9757.04, RHR A injection line valve, an element of
similar function and purpose. Table 9 shows the data file for target element 9757.04.

Table 9: Target Element #9757.04 Data File
Target Element Data file
Attribute
Value
9757.04
ID#
VS2A-FAIL
IDName
Rx Trip
Name
RHR A Inj line Valve
Type
AUX
Location
1,2,3,4,5,6
Modes
A
Train
RHR A
System
Y
Cyber?
Y
Flood?
Y
Fire?
Operator? N
Target Sets 9757

Upon choosing to copy target element 9757.04, a window would open with the
fields shown in Table 10.
The new target element is automatically assigned a new ID#, and the remaining
fields are “grayed.” The “grayed” text can be overwritten or removed, or if there is no
change, the “grayed” text is what is written to the new data file.
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Table 10: Copy of Target Element #9757.04 Data File
Target Element Data file COPY
Attribute
Value
9757.06
ID#
VS2A-FAIL
IDName
Rx Trip
Name
RHR A Inj line Valve
Type
AUX
Location
1,2,3,4,5,6
Modes
A
Train
RHR A
System
Y
Cyber?
Y
Flood?
Y
Fire?
N
Operator?
Synonymous to:

The last information field is where the user can enter a synonymous target
element. The target element does not need to be the same type of component, but needs
to be synonymous in the fault tree (the synonymous component is an “or” for the new
component). For this example, we could enter the valve we originally picked, target
element 9757.04, or we could pick another element. We pick the RHR A heat exchanger,
target element 201.01, as the single failure of either would disable RHR system A.
Upon selection of a synonymous target element and acceptance of the copy
command, the program would create the new target element data file, as well as new
target set files containing the new target element. When the program understands that a
target element is synonymous, it copies all target sets that the synonymous target element
is in, and replaces the synonymous target element with the new one in the copied target
sets. For example, if we choose the RHR A heat exchanger, target element 201.01, the
existing target set of our selection looks like Table 11.
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The program would take all target sets that target element 201.01 is in (in our
selection, that is only 201), and copy them to the new file to create the new synonymous
target set.

Table 11: Target Set #201 Data File
Target Set Data File
Attribute
Value
ID#
201
# Elements 3
# Locations 1
Modes
1,2,3,4
Train(s)
A,B
Systems
RPS, RHR
Cyber?
0.33
Flood?
0.33
Fire?
1
Operator? 0
Elements: 7.01, 201.01, 201.02

Table 12 shows the new target set that is synonymous with Target Set 201 as the
result of originally copying target element 201.01 and declaring the new target element
synonymous with 201.01.
For the creation of new target elements (and thus target sets), the program would
be uniquely designed to expand on the information already provided. The use of existing
data allows the user to trace the basis for inclusion of new elements in the target sets, and
allow ease of use in the maintenance of target sets as designs and procedures change on
site.
The traceability of the target sets to existing safety analyses is important as there
are systems, structures, and components not included in a PRA, that would need to be
included in target sets. For example, SSCs that only passively fail under normal
conditions are normally excluded from internal event PRAs, but as they could be targets
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for an adversary, those SSCs need to be included in target sets. Examples of passive
SSCs that could be targets of an adversary are: water tanks, building structures, and flood
and fire barriers.

Table 12: Target Set #9758 Data File (synonymous to TS 201)
Target Set Data File
Attribute
Value
ID#
9758
# Elements 3
# Locations 1
Modes
1,2,3,4
Train(s)
A,B
Systems
RPS, RHR
Cyber?
0.66
Flood?
0.66
Fire?
1
Operator? 0
Elements: 7.01, 201.02, 9757.06

Upon completion of target set development, the element build list and set build
lists can be used to sort and filter target elements and target sets for report generation and
printing. The primary purpose of these reporting options would be for target set
development and review.
Challenge Frame
The “challenge frame” of the program would start with data compiled in the
“build frame” and provide additional options for sorting, grouping and editing. For the
challenge frame, the “Element Build List” and “Set Build List” would gain additional
capabilities and become the “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List.” The
“challenge frame” would possess the capability to create and save different scenarios to
replicate site conditions under which an adversary attack would be credible. The
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“challenge frame” is intended for grouping target sets and elements to replicate adversary
attack goals and capabilities.
Grouping target elements in the “challenge frame” is achieved by “masking.”
Masking begins similarly to making a new target element in the “build frame.” Masking
different target elements seeks to simplify the target sets to commonly defended locations
containing many targets.
The main control room contains target elements for likely every target set, but it
can be simplified to a single target. Similarly, most equipment in reactor containment is
simplified to a single target, due to the multitude of ways an adversary could cause core
damage upon access. For this example, we will simplify all target elements found in
containment with a mask called “containment,” as shown in the mask data file in Table
13.
Mask 1 would replace all target elements listed on its data file within their target
sets. The answers for “Cyber?”, “Flood?”, “Fire?”, and “Operator?” give a conservative
response. If any element that is masked has a “Yes” answer, then the mask will too.

Table 13: Mask 1 Data File
Element Mask Data File
Attribute
Value
M1
ID#
Containment
Name
Containment
Location
1,2,3,4,5,6
Modes
A, B
Train(s)
Y
Cyber?
Y
Flood?
Y
Fire?
Operator? N
Elements: 14.01, 14.02, 14.03, 9757.02, 9757.03
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Mask 1 shows a “No” for “Operator?” as all elements contained within the mask
have a “No” for “Operator?” The “Target Set List” would reflect the changes to the
target sets, as shown by the highlighted target sets in Error! Not a valid bookmark selfreference..

Table 14: Target Set List with Mask 1 applied
ID#
7
14
30
201
710
928
1360
3062
3666
9757

# elements
2
1
3
3
4
4
5
6
6
5

# location
2
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
2
4

Modes
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4,5,6
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4

Train(s)
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B

Cyber?
1
1
0.66
0.33
1
0.5
1
0.83
1
0.8

Flood?
0.5
1
0.66
0.33
1
0.25
1
0.83
1
0.8

Fire?
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Operator?
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0

The “Target Element List” would show Mask 1, the elements it replaced would
not be shown unless the mask was removed. Masked target elements are not altered or
removed, but they are taken out of individual consideration for target sets within that save
file, and thus can be verified to still be represented within the target sets for review and
audit purposes.
Masks could also be used to group collocated elements susceptible to a single
action. If we assumed that the steam-powered and motor-powered emergency feedwater
pumps were collocated such that both could be destroyed or made inoperable at the same
time with the same action, we could mask the elements to have the target sets better
represent the conditions of the SGNP.
Table 15 shows target set 3666 before masking target elements 928.03 and
3062.02, the EFW A motor-operated and steam-operated pumps, into mask 2 (shown in
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Table 16). Mask 2 combines the EFW A pumps and provides an insight for the
protective strategy (wherein redundant pieces of equipment are collocated thus rendering
their safety system redundancy irrelevant to an adversary).

Table 15: Target Set #3666 Data File
Target Set Data File
Attribute
Value
3666
ID#
# Elements 6
# Locations 2
1,2,3,4
Modes
1,2,3,4
Train(s)
RPS,EFW A, MSSS A,
Systems
MSSS B, SD B
1
Cyber?
1
Flood?
1
Fire?
1
Operator?
7.01, 928.03, 1360.01,
1360.02, 1360.04, 3062.02
Elements:

Table 16: Mask 2 Data File
Element Mask Data File
Attribute
Value
M2
ID#
EFW A pumps
Name
EFW Bld A
Location
1,2,3,4
Modes
A
Train(s)
Y
Cyber?
Y
Flood?
Y
Fire?
Operator? N
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Elements: 928.03, 3062.02
Table 17 shows target set 3666 with the mask applied, reducing the number of
targets by one.

Table 17: Target Set 3666 with Mask 2 applied
Target Set Data File
Attribute
Value
3666
ID#
5
# Elements
# Locations 2
1,2,3,4
Modes
1,2,3,4
Train(s)
Systems
RPS,EFW A, MSSS A,
MSSS B, SD B
1
Cyber?
1
Flood?
1
Fire?
1
Operator?
7.01, 1360.01, 1360.02,
Elements:
1360.04, M2

Masks added to the target sets will systematically reduce the number of targets
and target sets, and although individual mask creation takes effort, the change takes effect
through hundreds or thousands of target sets. Representing these insights in a consistent,
traceable, and automated manner allows the target sets to reflect site conditions and
adversary tactics for a more robust product to inform the protective strategy.
For the purposes of creating challenge scenarios, target elements can be selected
as “out” to represent their unavailable, out of service, or destroyed state. Target elements
can be marked as “out” in either the “Target Element List” or in the individual target
element data files. The change would be reflected in the appropriate target sets. For
example, if we choose target element 928.03, the EFW A motor-operated pump, to be out
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of service, we can see that the highlighted target sets in Table 18 are changed as a result
of this equipment unavailability.
Table 18: Target Set List with element 928.03 unavailable
ID#
7
14
30
201
710
928
1360
3062
3666
9757

# elements
2
3
3
3
4
3
5
5
5
6

# location
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
4

Modes
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4,5,6
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4

Train(s)
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B
A, B

Cyber?
1
0.33
0.66
0.33
1
0.33
1
0.8
1
0.83

Flood?
0.5
0
0.66
0.33
1
0
1
0.8
1
0.83

Fire?
1
0.33
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Operator?
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0

The selecting of equipment as “out” may be saved under different scenarios files
in the “challenge frame.” The possibility of different save files allows for the automatic
updating of many different scenarios when changes are made to the target sets.
After masking, the target element list and target set list can be sorted and filtered
to show the updated qualities of the target sets desired. The sorts and filters could be
saved to file, so when the target sets are updated, the insight sought would be updated as
well and reflect the changes in the design. Reports could be generated from the target
sets, with options to print full lists of target elements and their associated parameters.
Reporting options could be saved so they are updated upon updates to the target sets.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The results of target set development are insights to inform the site protective
strategy. Using the program described, insights are easily determined for those target sets
that: have the greatest flood/fire/cyber susceptibility, fewest target elements or target
locations, have the greatest reliance on operator actions, are most affected by equipment
maintenance and unavailability, have elements that are not contained within a vital or
protected area, and are applicable to reactor modes of operations. The highlighting of the
most vulnerable target sets allows informed decisions to update and improve the site
protective strategy. The ability of the program to update target sets to plant configuration
and design changes allows the security program to update protective measures closely in
line with changes to plant safety systems and procedures.
Though the concept of target sets has been in practice since the early 1990s, the
maturation of the tool and guidance has been slow. As a tool to inform a protective
strategy, target sets wield great strength and flexibility, but currently are onerous and
imprecise to develop and maintain. The creation of a computer program to guide,
expedite and automate target set development and maintenance would affect greater
security at US commercial reactor facilities, as well as any other facility or system that
put the program into effect, while reducing overall costs.
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Figure 2: SGNP P&ID
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Figure 5: RX-TRIP Event Tree
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Figure 6: SL-A-BREAK Event Tree
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Figure 7: SL-B-BREAK Event Tree
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Figure 8: Acc-A Fault Tree
56

Accumulator B

ACC-B

ACC pipe
injection line to
CL B
1.000E-1
ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B

Accumulator
Tank B fail

1.000E-1
ACC-TANK-B-FAIL

ACC-B - Accumulator B

2015/01/14

Page 16

Figure 9: ACC-B Fault Tree
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lines

Failure to
maintain power

RHR B motor
operated pump
failure

RHR-B-I-PIPE-FAIL

POWER-FAIL

RHR-B-PUMP-UNIT-FAIL

1.000E-1

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

RHR B Valve
VS2B Fail

SW-COOL-FAIL

VS2B-FAIL

1.000E-1

RHR-B-V-PIPE-FAIL

RHR B Pipe containment to
Acc inj line A
1.000E-1
RHR-B-IA-PIPE-FAIL

HHSI B Pipe containment to
Acc inj line B

Loss off offsite
power

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

EDGs fail to take
load

Failure of
service water
system

EDGS-LOAD-FAIL

SW-FAIL

1.000E-1

HHSI-B-IB-PIPE-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

1.000E-1

LOOP

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

RWST B system
fail

Containment
Sump System B
Fail

RHR B HX unit
fails

RWST-B-SYS-FAIL

SUMP-SYS-B-FAIL

RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL

RHR B Valve
VS3B Fail

1.000E-1
VS3B-FAIL

CCW system fails
to cool

1.000E-1

RWST B Aux Bld
Interior Pipe fail

1.000E-1
RWST-B-AUX-PIPE-FAIL

RWST Exterior
piping or tank
fail
1.000E-1
RWST-PIPE-TANK-FAIL

Sump Sys B Aux
Bldg Pipe Fail

1.000E-1
SUMP-B-AUX-PIPE-FAIL

Sump Sys B
Valve VS5B fail

1.000E-1
VS5B-FAIL

Sump Sys B Aux
Bld Pipe to Cont
Fail
1.000E-1

Sump Sys B
containment
piping fail
1.000E-1

SUMP-B-AUX-C-PIPE-FAIL SUMP-B-CONT-PIPE-FAIL

Containment
Sump system fail

1.000E-1
SUMP-FAIL

CCW-SYS-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

CCW system
component fails

1.000E-1
CCW-COMP-FAIL

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of
service water
system

Failure of all
EDGs

Failure of
switchyard

EDGS-FAIL

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

1.000E-1

EDG A fails to
operate

EDG-B-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

EDG B unit or
fuel fails

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of
service water
system
1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

EDG B fails to
operate

EDG-A-FAIL

EDG A unit or
fuel fails

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of
service water
system

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System
1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

RHR-B - Residual Heat Removal
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Figure 17: RHR-B Fault Tree
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Steam Dump to
Atmosphere train
A

SD-ATM-A

Steam Dump
Valve VT2A Fail

1.000E-1
PIPING-FAIL

VT2A-FAIL

Failure of Feed
Steam Line A

Failure of Steam
Dump Piping to
atmosphere A

MS-A-PIPE-FAIL

SD-A-A-PIPE-FAIL

1.000E-1

Main Steam Line BA
in Containment Fails

1.000E-1
MS-A-CON-PIPE-FAIL

Main Steam Line
A in Turbine Bld
Fails
1.000E-1
MS-A-TB-PIPE-FAIL

SD-ATM-A - Steam Dump to Atmosphere train A
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Figure 18: SD-ATM-A Fault Tree
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Steam Dump to
Atmosphere train
B

SD-ATM-B

Steam Dump
Valve VT2B Fail

1.000E+0
PIPING-FAIL

VT2B

Failure of Main
Steam Line B

Failure of Steam
Dump Piping to
atmosphere B

MS-B-PIPE-FAIL

SD-A-B-PIPE-FAIL

1.000E-1

Main Steam Line B
in Containment Fails

1.000E-1
MS-B-CON-PIPE-FAIL

Main Steam Line
B in Turbine Bld
Fails
1.000E-1
MS-B-TB-PIPE-FAIL

SD-ATM-B - Steam Dump to Atmosphere train B
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Figure 19: SD-ATM-B Fault Tree
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Steam Dump to
Condenser A and
Feedwater A

SD-CN-FW-A

FW A motor
operated pump
fail

Steam Dump
Valve VT1A Fail

FW-A-MP-PUMP-FAIL

VT1A

Failure of condenser
sys A to adequately
remove heat

1.000E-1
PIPING-FAIL

Failure of Steam
Dump Piping to
Condenser A

Failure of Main
Steam Line A

Failure of Feed
Water A Piping

Failure to
maintain power

FW A motor
operated pump
failure

MS-A-PIPE-FAIL

FW-A-PIPE-FAIL

POWER-FAIL

FW-A-MP-FAIL

1.000E-1
SD-C-A-PIPE-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

Condenser System A
Fails

SW-COOL-FAIL

COND-A-FAIL

1.000E-1

Loss off offsite
power
Main Steam Line A
in Containment Fails

1.000E-1
MS-A-CON-PIPE-FAIL

Main Steam Line
A in Turbine Bld
Fails

1.000E-1

EDGs fail to take
load

Failure of service
water system

EDGS-LOAD-FAIL

SW-FAIL

1.000E-1

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System
1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

1.000E-1

LOOP

1.000E-1

COND-A-HEAT-REM-FAIL

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

MS-A-TB-PIPE-FAIL

Feed Water A
piping in
Containment Fail
1.000E-1
FW-A-CONT-PIPE-FAIL

Failure of all
EDGs

Failure of
switchyard

EDGS-FAIL

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

Feed Water A
piping in
Turbine Bld Fail

1.000E-1

1.000E-1
FW-A-TB-PIPE-FAIL
EDG A fails to
operate

EDG B fails to
operate

EDG-A-FAIL

EDG-B-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

EDG B unit or
fuel fails

SW-COOL-FAIL

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

EDG A unit or
fuel fails

1.000E-1
EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

1.000E-1

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

SD-CN-FW-A - Steam Dump to Condenser A and Feedwater A

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW
1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL
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Figure 20: SD-CN-FW-A Fault Tree
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Steam Dump to
Condenser B and
Feedwater B

SD-CN-FW-B

FW B motor
operated pump
fail

Steam Dump
Valve VT1B Fail

FW-B-MP-PUMP-FAIL

VT1B

Failure of condenser
sys B to adequately
remove heat

1.000E-1
PIPING-FAIL

Failure of Steam
Dump Piping to
condenser B

Failure of Main
Steam Line B

Failure of Feed
Water B Piping

Failure to
maintain power

FW B motor
operated pump
failure

MS-B-PIPE-FAIL

FW-B-PIPE-FAIL

POWER-FAIL

FW-B-MP-FAIL

1.000E-1
SD-C-B-PIPE-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

Condenser System B
Fails

SW-COOL-FAIL

COND-B-FAIL

1.000E-1

Loss off offsite
power
Main Steam Line B
in Containment Fails

1.000E-1
MS-B-CON-PIPE-FAIL

Main Steam Line
B in Turbine Bld
Fails

1.000E-1

EDGs fail to take
load

Failure of service
water system

EDGS-LOAD-FAIL

SW-FAIL

1.000E-1

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System
1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

1.000E-1

LOOP

1.000E-1

COND-B-HEAT-REM-FAIL

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

MS-B-TB-PIPE-FAIL

Feed Water B
piping in
Containment Fail
1.000E-1
FW-B-CONT-PIPE-FAIL

Failure of all
EDGs

Failure of
switchyard

EDGS-FAIL

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

Feed Water B
piping in
Turbine Bld Fail

1.000E-1

1.000E-1
FW-B-TB-PIPE-FAIL
EDG A fails to
operate

EDG B fails to
operate

EDG-A-FAIL

EDG-B-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

EDG B unit or
fuel fails

SW-COOL-FAIL

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

EDG A unit or
fuel fails

1.000E-1
EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

1.000E-1

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

SD-CN-FW-B - Steam Dump to Condenser B and Feedwater B

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW
1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL
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Figure 21: SD-CN-FW-B Fault Tree
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Steam
Line
A

SL-A

PIPING-FAIL

FW A motor
operated pump
fail

Failure of Turbine A
to adequately
remove heat

FW-A-MP-PUMP-FAIL

HEAT-REMOVAL-A-FAIL

Failure of Feed
Steam Line A

Failure of Feed
Water A Piping

Failure to
maintain power

FW A motor
operated pump
failure

MS-A-PIPE-FAIL

FW-A-PIPE-FAIL

POWER-FAIL

FW-A-MP-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

Failure of turbine A
or electrial load A

Failure of condenser
sys A to adequately
remove heat

SW-COOL-FAIL

ELECTRICAL-LOAD-A-FAIL

COND-A-HEAT-REM-FAIL

1.000E-1

Loss off offsite
power
Main Steam Line A
in Containment Fails

1.000E-1
MS-A-CON-PIPE-FAIL

Main Steam Line
A in Turbine Bld
Fails

EDGs fail to take
load

Failure of service
water system

EDGS-LOAD-FAIL

SW-FAIL

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

LOOP

1.000E-1

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

Condenser System A
Fails

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

CIRCW-FAIL

1.000E-1

COND-A-FAIL

CIRCW-FAIL

MS-A-TB-PIPE-FAIL

Feed Water A
piping in
Containment Fail
1.000E-1
FW-A-CONT-PIPE-FAIL

Failure of all
EDGs

Failure of
switchyard

EDGS-FAIL

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

Feed Water A
piping in
Turbine Bld Fail

Turbine A Fails

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

1.000E-1
TURBINE-A-FAIL

Generator A
Fails

1.000E-1
GEN-A-FAILS

Failure of
switchyard

1.000E-1
SWITCHYARD-FAIL

FW-A-TB-PIPE-FAIL
EDG A fails to
operate

EDG B fails to
operate

EDG-A-FAIL

EDG-B-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

EDG B unit or
fuel fails

SW-COOL-FAIL

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

EDG A unit or
fuel fails

1.000E-1
EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

1.000E-1

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

SL-A - Steam Line A
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Figure 22: SL-A Fault Tree
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Steam
Line B

SL-B

SL-B-PIPING-FAIL

Failure of Main
Steam Line B

FW B motor
operated pump
fail

Failure of Turbine B
to adequately
remove heat

FW-B-MP-PUMP-FAIL

HEAT-REMOVAL-B-FAIL

Failure to
maintain power

FW B motor
operated pump
failure

POWER-FAIL

FW-B-MP-FAIL

Failure of Feed
Water B Piping

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

Failure of turbine B
or electrial load B

Failure of condenser
sys B to adequately
remove heat

SW-COOL-FAIL

ELECTRICAL-LOAD-B-FAIL

COND-B-HEAT-REM-FAIL

1.000E-1

MS-B-PIPE-FAIL

FW-B-PIPE-FAIL
Loss off offsite
power

Main Steam Line
B in Containment
Fails
1.000E-1
MS-B-CON-PIPE-FAIL

Main Steam Line
B in Turbine Bld
Fails

EDGs fail to take
load

Failure of service
water system

EDGS-LOAD-FAIL

SW-FAIL

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

LOOP

1.000E-1

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Cool System

Condenser System B
Fails

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

CIRCW-FAIL

1.000E-1

COND-B-FAIL

CIRCW-FAIL

MS-B-TB-PIPE-FAIL

Feed Water B
piping in
Containment Fail
1.000E-1
FW-B-CONT-PIPE-FAIL

Failure of all
EDGs

Failure of
switchyard

EDGS-FAIL

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

Feed Water B
piping in
Turbine Bld Fail

Turbine B Fails

1.000E-1

1.000E-1

1.000E-1
TURBINE-B-FAIL

Generator B Fails

1.000E-1
GEN-B-FAILS

Failure of
switchyard

1.000E-1
SWITCHYARD-FAIL

FW-B-TB-PIPE-FAIL
EDG A fails to
operate

EDG B fails to
operate

EDG-A-FAIL

EDG-B-FAIL

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

EDG B unit or
fuel fails

SW-COOL-FAIL

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

EDG A unit or
fuel fails

1.000E-1
EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

Service Water
System Fails to
Cool

1.000E-1

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW

SW-COOL-FAIL

Failure of service
water to cool

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

Failure of Circ
Water Sys to
Supply SW

1.000E-1
SW-FAIL

1.000E-1
CIRCW-FAIL

SL-B - Steam Line B
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Figure 23: SL-B Fault Tree
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Table 19: Element Build List after import from PRA data file
ID#

IDName

7.01

RPS-TRIP

Target Sets
7, 201, 710, 1360,
3062, 3666

7.02

CCW-COMP-FAIL

7, 928

14.01

RCS-LBLOCA

14, 30

14.02

ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-A

14

14.03

14

30.02

ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B
HHSI-A-PUMP-UNITFAIL
HHSI-B-PUMP-UNITFAIL

201.01

RHR-A-HX-UNIT-FAIL

201

201.02

RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL

201

710.01

EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

710

710.02

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

710

710.03

LOOP

710

928.01

SL-A-BREAK

928, 9757

928.02

COND-B-FAIL

928, 3062

928.03

EFW-A-MP-FAIL

928, 3062, 3666

1360.01

FW-A-MP-FAIL

1360, 3666

1360.02

FW-B-MP-FAIL

1360, 3666

1360.03

VT2A-FAIL

1360

1360.04

VT2B-FAIL

1360, 3062, 3666

3062.01

COND-A-FAIL

3062

3062.02

EFW-A-SP-FAIL

3062, 3666

9757.01

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

9757

9757.02

VE2A-FAIL

9757

9757.03

VE3A-FAIL

9757

9757.04

VS2A-FAIL

9757

9757.05

VS2B-FAIL

9757

30.01

Name

Type

Location

Modes

Train

System

Cyber?

Flood?

Fire?

Operator?

30
30
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Table 20: Element Build List with Complete Information Fields
ID#

IDName

Name

Type

7.01

RPS-TRIP

Rx Trip

Rx trip

7.02

CCW-COMP-FAIL

Comp. Cool Water

Cool Sys.

14.01

RCS-LBLOCA

Large Break LOCA

LOCA

14.02

ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-A

CL injection line A

14.03

CL injection line B

30.02

ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B
HHSI-A-PUMP-UNITFAIL
HHSI-B-PUMP-UNITFAIL

System

Cyber?

Flood?

Fire?

Operator?

1,2,3,4

RPS

Y

Y

Y

N

Target Sets
7, 201, 710, 1360,
3062, 3666

AUX

1,2,3,4,5,6

CCW

Y

N

Y

N

7, 928

Cont.

1,2,3,4,5,6

RCS

N

N

Y

N

14, 30

Pipe

Cont.

1,2,3,4,5,6

A

SIS A

N

N

N

N

14

Pipe

Cont.

1,2,3,4,5,6

B

SIS B

N

N

N

N

14

High Pres Inj Pump A

Pump

AUX

1,2,3,4

A

SIS A

Y

Y

Y

N

30

201.01

RHR-A-HX-UNIT-FAIL

High Pres Inj Pump B

Pump

AUX

1,2,3,4

B

SIS B

Y

Y

Y

N

30

RHR Heat Exc. A

HX

AUX

1,2,3,4,5,6

A

RHR A

N

N

Y

N

201

201.02
710.01

RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL

RHR Heat Exc. B

HX

AUX

1,2,3,4,5,6

B

RHR B

N

N

Y

N

201

EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS

EDG System A

EDG

EDG A

1,2,3,4,5,6

EDG A

Y

Y

Y

N

710

710.02

EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS

EDG System B

EDG

EDG B

1,2,3,4,5,6

EDG B

Y

Y

Y

N

710

710.03

LOOP

Loss of Offsite Power

IE

Power

Y

Y

Y

N

710

928.01

SL-A-BREAK

Steam/FW ln bk A

SL break

TB

1,2,3,4

A

MSSS A

N

N

Y

N

928, 9757

928.02

COND-B-FAIL

Condenser B

Condenser

TB

1,2,3,4

B

MSSS B

N

N

Y

N

928, 3062

928.03

EFW-A-MP-FAIL

EFW A motor pump

Pump

EFW A

1,2,3,4

A

EFW A

Y

Y

Y

N

928, 3062, 3666

1360.01

FW-A-MP-FAIL

FW A motor pump

Pump

TB

1,2,3,4

A

MSSS A

Y

Y

Y

N

1360, 3666

1360.02

FW-B-MP-FAIL

FW B motor pump

Pump

TB

1,2,3,4

B

MSSS B

Y

Y

Y

N

1360, 3666

1360.03

VT2A-FAIL

Steam-Atm valve A

Valve

TB

1,2,3,4

A

SD A

Y

Y

Y

Y

1360

1360.04

VT2B-FAIL

Steam-Cond valve A

Valve

TB

1,2,3,4

B

SD B

Y

Y

Y

Y

1360, 3062, 3666

3062.01

COND-A-FAIL

Condenser A

Condenser

TB

1,2,3,4

A

MSSS A

Y

Y

Y

N

3062

3062.02

EFW-A-SP-FAIL

EFW A steam pump

Pump

EFW Bld A

1,2,3,4

A

EFW A

Y

Y

Y

N

3062, 3666

9757.01

SWITCHYARD-FAIL

Unit Switchyard

Switchyard

Switchyard

1,2,3,4,5,6

Power

Y

Y

Y

N

9757

9757.02

VE2A-FAIL

EFW A SP valve

Valve

Cont.

1,2,3,4

A

EFW A

Y

Y

Y

N

9757

9757.03

VE3A-FAIL

EFW A transfer valve

Valve

Cont.

1,2,3,4

A

EFW A

Y

Y

Y

N

9757

9757.04

VS2A-FAIL

RHR A Inj line Valve

Valve

AUX

1,2,3,4,5,6

A

RHR A

Y

Y

Y

N

9757

9757.05

VS2B-FAIL

RHR B Inj line Valve

Valve

AUX

1,2,3,4,5,6

B

RHR B

Y

Y

Y

N

9757

30.01

Location

Modes

Train

1,2,3,4,5,6
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